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PROFESSOR PRATT, CRITICAL REALISM, AND THE
MAN OF COMMON SENSE.
BY JOHN EDMOND HEARN.
IS it possible to make philosophy understood hy him who runs while
reading? Runs, that is. in the sense that a clock runs; does not
cease to operate ; works union hours, has three meals a day, sleeps
nights. Is it possible, without giving up Itusiness, to learn what all
the Deep Thinking is for ?
James Bissett Pratt, Professor of Philosophy in Williams Col-
lege, seems to think' it is. He contributed an essay to the volume of
Essays in Critical Realism (Macmillan). The other essays are by
six other philosophers in six other colleges.
Common sense, says Pratt, is merely primitive philosophy.
So David Harum, Mrs. Wiggs, and Abe Lincoln are primitive
philosophers.
The snap judgments of common sense are often wrong. We are
told that they must be corrected in view of the facts of error and illu-
sion and the differences between the data of different perceivers and
between those of the same perceiver at different times.
Common sense is good enough, then, only if one is not a serious
thinker or has Ijegun to think at all.
^Modern philosophy, like modern science, is the result of a slow
development. Modern philosophers should be allowed the right to
ridicule the earlier thinkers. The more they ridicule the more inter-
esting they become to laymen.
"Descartes." according to Pratt, "discovered that by a great ef-
fort he could succeed in doubting everything except the immediate
content of his own consciousness. Thereupon, by a still greater
effort, he deduced God from the fact of his idea of God ; and, hav-
ing secured God, he succeeded eventually in recreating the world."
The dualistic view of mind and its objects was common among
philosophers up to the time of Descartes. He queered it, as the
vulgar say.
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Still, he was the champion dualist till John Locke arrived. Des-
cartes was willing to accept the content of his own mind as real ; but
Locke would take only a part of that content—"the perception of the
connection and agreement, or disagreement and repugnance, of any
of our ideas"—as knowledge.
Berkeley followed Locke, and it was Berkeley who in a peculiar
sense broke down the walls of the "Lockian prison." Locke said
that we could not know the outer world. Very well, Berkeley said,
there is no outer world to be known; there is nothing real except
ideas, which are God-inspired.
Kant would have none of "der gute Berkeley's" idealism, and so
returned to the dualism of Descartes and Locke, which he made abso-
lute. Kant said that between the real and the unknowable there is an
impassable gulf.
The neo-Kantians espoused an objective idealism which resem-
bled Berkeley's subjectivism; for them, Kant's world of things-in-
themselves was abolished.
"Realism," says Pratt, "had led to scepticism because of the
exaggerated dualism of Descartes, Locke, and Kant.
The neo-realists, who appeared at the beginning of the present
century, claimed that we are not shut olT from the real by our ideas
;
we know things directly ; ideas do not intervene ; there are no ideas.
"Knowledge is not a relation between a knowing subject and an ob-
ject known. It is merely a special sort of relation between objects.
And since objects may thus be known directly, there is no longer any
danger of agnosticism."
What are you thinking of when you are thinking of a dead man ?
Locke's answer could only be that you are thinking of the idea of
the man dead. The neo-realist would have to say that one's present
concept somehow is the man himself altho he is dead, not present but
past. The modern philosophy of critical idealism maintains that the
object of one's thought is exactly the man himself. The concept is
not the object of thought but the means of thinking—one of the tools
required for conceiving the object.
The quality-group, according to critical realism, is not the object
of perception but the means by which one perceives. This is the
chief point of difference between critical realism and the two other
forms of realism, those of Locke and the neo-realists.
If we perceive only our perceptions, as Locke held, we are "im-
prisoned within our ideas."
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Pratt makes the neo-realists out as rather aljsurd with his ex-
ample of yesterday's headache. If the object of thought must actu-
ally he present, in thinking of yesterday's headache one's head would
ache today.
It seems that the fallible kind of perception and knowledge in-
volved in critical realism is exactly the kind of perception and knowl-
edge which we really have. To that extent, necessarilx-. critical real-
ism is agnostic ; it does not know everything.
The task of the epistemologist, says Pratt, is to expound the
conditions of knowledge actualh' obtaining in the "somewhat unsat-
isfactory world we have to live in."
Idealism, pragmatism, and neo-realism are philosophical systems
made to order with a view to ''avoiding agnosticism." Consequently,
they fail to apply "to such very fallible beings as we."
Critical realism, says Pratt, "does not pretend to provide us with
a bell that rings when we are right or a whistle that blows when we
are wrong."
To sum up the system, it holds that physical entities exist inde-
pendently of being known; that the>- may be the mind's object but
not its content ; that they differ in some respects from the quality-
groups of our perception, but that they are so related to our percepts
that science may investigate some of their relations to our percepts
and to each other, and thus gain trustworthy knowledge.
That is not agnosticism.
